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Abstract—This paper derives outer bounds on the secrecy
capacity region of the 2-user Z interference channel (Z-IC) with
rate-limited unidirectional cooperation between the transmitters.
First, the model is studied under the linear deterministic setting.
The derivation of the outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region
involves careful selection of the side information to be provided to
the receivers and using the secrecy constraints at the receivers in a
judicious manner. To this end, a novel partitioning of the encoded
messages and outputs is proposed for the deterministic model
based on the strength of interference and signal. The obtained
outer bounds are shown to be tight using the achievable scheme
derived by the authors in a previous work. Using the insight
obtained from the deterministic model, outer bounds on the
secrecy capacity region of the 2-user Gaussian Z-IC are obtained.
The equivalence between the outer bounds for both the models
is also established. It is also shown that secrecy constraint at the
receiver does not hurt the capacity region of the 2-user Z-IC
for the deterministic model in the weak/moderate interference
regime. On the other hand, the outer bounds developed for the
Gaussian case shows that secrecy constraint at the receiver can
reduce the capacity region for the weak/moderate interference
regime. The study of the relative performance of these bounds
reveals insight into the fundamental limits of the 2-user Z-IC
with limited rate transmitter cooperation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interference is one of the primary factors in limiting the
performance of wireless communication systems. Users are
also susceptible to eavesdropping, due to the broadcast na-
ture of the wireless medium. One way to tackle both these
issues is through cooperation between the legitimate users.
However, the effect of cooperation on secure communication
in interference limited scenarios is not well understood. Such
cooperation can affect the performance limits of the system
in a completely different way compared to communication
systems where reliable communication is the sole aim [1]–
[4]. In this work, outer bounds on the secrecy capacity
region are developed for the 2-user Z interference channel (Z-
IC) with rate-limited unidirectional cooperation between the
transmitters.
An important information theoretic channel model, and the
one investigated in this paper, is the Z-IC with unidirectional,
rate-limited transmitter cooperation and secrecy constraints at
the receivers [5], [6]. Practically, it models, for example, a 2-
tier network, where the macro cell user is close to the edge
of the femtocell while the femtocell user is close to the femto
base station (BS). Since the macro BS can typically support
higher complexity transmission schemes, it could use the side
information received from the femto BS to precode its data
to improve its own rate and simultaneously ensure secrecy
at the femtocell user. At the receivers, the macro cell user
could experience significant interference from the femtocell
BS, while the femtocell user sees little or no interference from
the macro BS, leading to the Z channel as the appropriate
model for the system. Thus, the developed bounds give useful
insights on the fundamental limits of communication.
A. Prior works
The capacity region of the IC has remained an open
problem, even without secrecy constraints at the receivers,
except for some specific cases [7], [8]. In [7], it is shown
that rate as high as that achievable without the interference
can be achieved in 2-user IC, when the interfering links are
sufficiently stronger than the direct links. In [8], the capacity
region of the IC is characterized for the strong interference
regime. The IC with secrecy constraints has been analyzed
in [9], [10]. In [11], it is shown that a nonzero secrecy rate
can be achieved even when the eavesdropper has a better
channel compared to the legitimate receiver, in case of the
wiretap channel with a helping interferer. This work also
proposed computable outer bounds on the secrecy rate, where
the tightest outer bound depends on the channel conditions.
It has been shown that limited rate cooperation between
users can improve the rates significantly in case of IC [1],
[2], [12], when reliable communication is the sole aim. In [1]
and [12] outer bounds on the capacity region of the 2-user
Gaussian IC are obtained when the transmitters can cooperate
through a lossless link of finite capacity and a noisy link,
respectively. In [2], outer bounds on the capacity region of
the 2-user Gaussian IC are obtained when the receivers can
cooperate through a lossless link of finite capacity. However,
obtaining outer bounds on the capacity region with transmitter
cooperation is harder than obtaining bounds under receiver
cooperation, because, in the former case, the encoded mes-
sages are dependent due to transmitter cooperation. In [3],
[13], outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the 2-
user linear deterministic model and Gaussian symmetric IC
2are developed, where transmitters can cooperate through a
lossless link of finite capacity. In [14], a tighter outer bound
is obtained for the linear deterministic model with secrecy
constraint and without transmitter cooperation for the initial
part of the moderate interference regime. Outer bounds on
the secrecy capacity region for other communication models
under different assumptions of cooperation can be found in
[15]–[18].
The Z-IC model has also been studied in the existing
literature with and without secrecy constraints [5], [19], [20].
In [5], outer bounds on the capacity region of the Gaussian
Z-IC for the weak/moderate interference regimes are derived
when there is no secrecy constraints at the receivers. In [19],
for a special class of Z-IC, the capacity region is established.
In [20], for the weak/moderate interference regime, the outer
bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the 2-user Z-IC
without transmitter cooperation is shown to be tight for the
deterministic case. The outer bounds on the capacity region
of the Z-IC with transmitter/receiver cooperation and without
the secrecy constraint have been obtained in [21]–[23]. In
[21], both the encoders can cooperate through noiseless links
with finite capacities and the outer bounds developed helps
to establish the sum capacity of the channel within 2 bits per
channel use. The role of cooperation between the receivers
is investigated in [22], [23]. However, outer bounds on the
secrecy capacity region of the 2-user Z-IC with unidirectional
transmitter cooperation have not been addressed in the existing
literature. Deriving such bounds can offer key insight into
the fundamental limits of secure communication in the Z-IC
with unidirectional limited rate transmitter cooperation, and is
therefore the focus of this work.
B. Contributions
This work considers unidirectional transmitter cooperation
in the form of a rate-limited lossless link from transmitter 2
(which causes interference) to transmitter 1 (which does not
cause interference), and with secrecy constraints at receivers.
The objective of this paper is to derive outer bounds on the
secrecy capacity region of the 2-user Z-IC with unidirectional
transmitter cooperation and secrecy constraints at the receivers.
This, in turn, requires judicious use of the secrecy constraint
at receiver, along with careful selection of the side information
to be provided to the receivers. In particular, the cooperation
between the transmitters makes the encoded messages depen-
dent, which makes derivation of the outer bounds even more
difficult.
First, the problem is solved under the deterministic approx-
imation of the channel. The study of the deterministic model
gives useful insights, and motivates the outer bounds in the
Gaussian setting. However, it is non-trivial to extend the results
obtained for the deterministic case to the Gaussian setting due
to the well known differences between the two models [24].
The main contributions of the paper are summarized below:
1) The key novelty in deriving outer bounds on the secrecy
capacity region for the deterministic model is the choice
of side information to be provided to the receiver(s) and
the judicious use of the secrecy constraints at the re-
ceivers. To elaborate, a novel partitioning of the encoded
messages and outputs is proposed for the deterministic
model based on the strength of interference and signal.
This partitioning helps to bound or simplify the entropy
terms that are difficult to evaluate due to the dependence
between the encoded messages.
2) Outer bounds are developed for the Gaussian case by
providing appropriate side information and bounding the
entropy terms containing both discrete and continuous
random variables, based on the insights obtained for the
deterministic case (Sec. IV). The outer bounds derived
on the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian Z-IC are
the best known outer bounds till date with unidirectional
transmitter cooperation.
3) The outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the 2-
user Z-IC without cooperation between the transmitters
can be obtained as special case of the analysis for both
the models. Note that, prior to this work, the capacity
region of the Z-IC for the deterministic model with
secrecy constraints was not fully known even for the
non-cooperating case [20].
The outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the 2-
user Z-IC for the deterministic model does not use the secrecy
constraints at the receivers in the weak/moderate interference
regime. It is found that the achievable results obtained for
this model in [25] matches with the outer bounds derived in
this work for the weak/moderate interference regime. Hence,
there is no penalty on the capacity region of the Z-IC due to
the secrecy constraints at the receivers in the weak/moderate
interference regimes. However, in the very high interference
regime, irrespective of the capacity of the cooperative link,
the outer bounds developed for the deterministic model shows
that user 2 cannot achieve any nonzero secrecy rate. On the
other hand, the outer bounds developed for the Gaussian case
show that secrecy constraint can reduce the capacity region of
the Z-IC in all the interference regimes. Part of this work has
appeared in [25].
Notation: Lower case or upper case letters represent scalars,
lower case boldface letters represent vectors, upper case bold-
face letters represent matrices, (x)+ , max{0, x} and ⌊.⌋
denotes the floor operation.
Organization: Section II presents the system model. In
Secs. III and IV, the outer bounds for the deterministic and
Gaussian models are presented, respectively. In Sec. V, some
numerical examples are presented to offer a deeper insight into
the bounds. Concluding remarks are offered in Sec. VI; and
the proofs of the theorems are provided in the Appendices.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a 2-user Gaussian symmetric Z-IC with unidirec-
tional and rate-limited transmitter cooperation from transmit-
ter 2 to 1, as shown in Fig. 1(a).1 In the Z-IC, only one of the
users (i.e., transmitter 2) causes interference to the unintended
receiver (i.e., receiver 1). The received signal at receiver i, yi,
is given by
y1 = hdx1 + hcx2 + z1; y2 = hdx2 + z2, (1)
1The model is termed as symmetric since the links from transmitter 1 to
receiver 1 and from transmitter 2 to receiver 2 are of the same strength.
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Fig. 1. 2-user Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation (from
transmitter 2 to transmitter 1).
where zj (j = 1, 2) is the additive white Gaussian noise,
distributed as N (0, 1). Here, hd and hc are the channel
gains of the direct and interfering links, respectively. The
input signals (xi) are required to satisfy the power constraint:
E[|xi|2] ≤ P . The transmitter 2 cooperates with transmitter 1
through a noiseless and secure link of finite rate denoted by
CG.
The equivalent deterministic model of (1) at high SNR is
given by [1], [20]
y1 = D
q−mx1 ⊕Dq−nx2; y2 = Dq−mx2, (2)
where x1 (x2) is the binary input vector of the deterministic
Z-IC from user 1 (user 2) of length m (max{m,n}); y1 (y2)
is the binary output vector of length max{m,n} (m); D is
a q × q downshift matrix with elements dj′,j′′ = 1 if 2 ≤
j′ = j′′ + 1 ≤ q and dj′,j′′ = 0 otherwise; and the operator
⊕ stands for modulo-2 addition, i.e., the XOR operation. The
deterministic model is also shown in Fig. 1(b).
The deterministic model is a first order approximation of
a Gaussian channel, where all the signals are represented by
their binary expansions. Here, noise is modeled by truncation,
and the superposition of signals at the receiver is modeled by
modulo 2 addition. Hence, the parameters m, n, and C of
the deterministic model are related to the Gaussian symmetric
Z-IC as m = (⌊0.5 logSNR⌋)+, n = (⌊0.5 log INR⌋)+,
and C = ⌊CG⌋. Note that the notation followed for the
deterministic model is the same as that presented in [1]. The
bits ai ∈ F2 and bi ∈ F2 denote the information bits of
transmitters 1 and 2, respectively, sent on the ith level, with
the levels numbered starting from the bottom-most entry.
The transmitter i has a message Wi, which should be
decodable at the intended receiver i, but needs to be kept
secret from the other, i.e., the unintended receiver j (j 6= i),
and this is termed as the secrecy constraint. Note that, for
the Z-IC, the message W1 is secure as there is no link from
transmitter 1 to receiver 2. Hence, the goal is to ensure that W2
is not decodable at receiver 1. The encoding at transmitter 1
should satisfy the causality constraint, i.e., it cannot depend
on the signal to be sent over the cooperative link in the future.
The signal sent over the cooperative link from transmitter 2 to
transmitter 1 is represented by v21. It is also assumed that the
transmitters trust each other completely and they do not deviate
from the agreed schemes, for both the models. For both the
models, the encoded message at transmitter 1 is a function of
its own message, the signal received over the cooperative link
and possibly some artificial noise or jamming signal, whereas,
the encoded message at transmitter 2 is independent of the
other user’s message. In the derivation of the outer bounds
for the deterministic and Gaussian models, the notion of weak
secrecy is considered, i.e., 1
N
I(W2;y
N
1 ) → 0 as N → ∞,
where N corresponds to the block length [26].
The following interference regimes are considered:
weak/moderate interference regime (0 ≤ α ≤ 1), high
interference regime (1 < α ≤ 2) and very high interference
regime (α > 2), where, with slight abuse of notation α , n
m
is used for the deterministic model and α , log INRlog SNR is used
for the Gaussian model. The quantity α captures the amount
of coupling between the signal and interference.
III. OUTER BOUNDS FOR THE LINEAR DETERMINISTIC
Z-IC MODEL
In this section, outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region
for the linear deterministic Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter
cooperation are presented for the different interference regimes
as Theorems 1-3. Note that in all interference regimes, the
rate of both the users can be trivially upper bounded by m,
i.e., R1 ≤ m and R2 ≤ m. One of the key techniques used in
deriving tight outer bounds is to partition the encoded message,
output, or both, depending on the value of α. The partitioning
of the encoded messages/outputs gives insights on the side
information to be provided to the receiver. This in turn allows
one to exploit the secrecy constraint at the receiver to obtain
tight and tractable outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region
of the Z-IC. This partitioning also helps to simplify the entropy
terms as the encoded messages at the transmitters are not
independent due to the cooperation between the transmitters.
The following Markov relation is used in the derivation
of these outer bounds: conditioned on the cooperating signal
(vN21), the encoded signals and the messages at the two
transmitters are independent [1], [27], i.e.,
(W1,x
N
1 )→ (vN21)→ (W2,xN2 ). (3)
For the derivation of the first outer bound in the weak/moderate
interference regime, the encoded message x1 is partitioned
into two parts: one part (x1a), which is received without
interference at receiver 1, and another part (x1b), which is
received with interference at receiver 1. The encoded message
of transmitter 2 is also split into two parts: one part (x2a),
which causes interference to receiver 1, and another part (x2b),
which does not cause any interference to receiver 1. The
partitioning of the output and the encoded message is shown
in Fig. 2(a). In the derivation of this outer bound, the secrecy
constraints at the receivers are not used. To get insights on
this, consider the following two cases in Fig. 3. In Fig. 3(a), it
can be noticed that user 1 can transmit m bits securely as there
is no link from transmitter 1 to receiver 2. Hence, user 1 can
achieve the maximum rate of m. On the other hand, user 2 can
transmit on the lower levels [1 : m−n] and it can send m−n
bits securely. Hence, the rate point (m,m− n) is achievable.
In Fig. 3(b), user 2 sends data bits on the levels [1 : m]. As
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Fig. 2. Deterministic model: partitioning of encoded messages and outputs.
the data bits sent on the levels [m − n + 1 : m] are received
at receiver 1, transmitter 1 sends random bits generated from
B(12 ) distribution on the levels [1 : n] to ensure secrecy of the
data bits of transmitter 2 at receiver 1. Hence, user 2 can also
achieve the maximum possible rate of m. On the remaining
levels [n + 1 : m], transmitter 1 sends its own data bits. As
transmitter 2 does not cause any interference to the data bits
sent on these levels by transmitter 1, receiver 1 can decode
these data bits. Hence, transmitter 1 achieves a rate of m−n,
and the rate point (m−n,m) is achievable. It is not difficult to
see that, even if there is no secrecy constraint at the receivers,
it is not possible to achieve rates exceeding the corner points
(m,m−n) and (m−n,m). This motivates one to derive the
outer bounds on the capacity region without using the secrecy
constraints at the receivers.
Theorem 1: In the weak and moderate interference regimes,
i.e., 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the secrecy capacity region of the 2-user
deterministic Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation
is upper bounded as
R1 ≤ m,R2 ≤ m, and
R1 +R2 ≤ 2m− n+ C. (4)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remarks:
• Interestingly, using the above theorem and the achievable
result in [25], it can be shown that the secrecy constraints
at the receivers do not result in any penalty on the
capacity region. Thus, secrecy can be obtained for free in
the weak/moderate interference regimes, for all the values
of C. The outer bound in Theorem 1 also serves as outer
bound on the capacity region of the 2-user Z-IC with
unidirectional limited rate transmitters cooperation, when
there is no secrecy constraints at the receivers.
• When C = 0 and 0 < α ≤ 1, the outer bound derived
in Theorem 1 matches the outer bound in Theorem 2 in
[20].
It is intuitive to think that as the strength of interference
increases, the achievable secrecy rate may decrease. In partic-
ular, in the high/very high interference regimes, the secrecy
constraint may lead to a rate penalty, in contrast to the
weak/moderate interference regime. Hence, in the high/very
high interference regime, the secrecy constraint is used along
C = 0
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Fig. 3. Achievable schemes: deterministic Z-IC with m = 5, n = 3 and
C = 0.
with the reliability criteria in the derivation of the outer
bounds.
First, consider the high interference regime, i.e., 1 < α < 2.
In this case, it is not difficult to see that the rate of user 1
can be upper bounded by m. To get insights into the outer
bounds on R2 and R1 + R2, consider Fig. 2(b). One can
see that transmitter 2 cannot use the levels [1 : n − m] for
transmitting its own data as the corresponding links do not
exist at the intended receiver. Any data bits transmitted on
the levels [m + 1 : n], i.e., x2a, will be received without
interference at receiver 1. If receiver 2 can decode these data
bits, receiver 1 will also be able to decode these data bits.
Hence, these data bits y1a = x2a will not be secure. Hence,
they are provided as side information to receiver 2 to obtain the
upper bounds. Then, using the secrecy constraint at receiver 1,
the following outer bounds can be obtained.
Theorem 2: In the high interference regime, i.e., 1 < α <
2, the secrecy capacity region of the 2-user deterministic Z-IC
with unidirectional transmitter cooperation is upper bounded
as
R1 ≤ m,R2 ≤ 2m− n, and
R1 +R2 ≤ m+ C. (5)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remarks:
• The outer bound on R2 shows that there is a nonzero
penalty on the rate of user 2 due to the secrecy constraint
at receiver 1, in contrast to the weak/moderate interfer-
ence regime (see Theorem 1).
• When C = 0, the outer bound on the sum rate suggests
that for user 2 to achieve a nonzero secrecy rate, user 1
has to sacrifice some of its rate.
Now, consider the derivation of the outer bound for the
very high interference regime. In Fig. 4, it can be noticed that
only the levels [n − m + 1 : m] can be used to send data
from transmitter 2 to receiver 2, as the links corresponding to
the lower levels [1 : n − m] do not exist at receiver 2. The
data bits transmitted on the levels [n −m + 1 : n], i.e., x2a,
are received without interference at receiver 1. If receiver 2
can decode these data bits, then receiver 1 can also decode
these data bits. Hence, transmitter 2 cannot send any data
bits securely on these levels. To capture this in the derivation,
5C
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receiver 2 is provided with the side information of the form
yN1a, which in turn helps to bound the rate by I(W2;yN2 |yN1a).
It can be noticed that this quantity is zero as y1a = y2 = x2a.
The outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region in the very
high interference regime (α ≥ 2) are given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: In the very high interference regime, i.e., α ≥
2, the secrecy capacity of the 2-user Z-IC with unidirectional
cooperation is upper bounded by R1 ≤ m and R2 ≤ 0.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark: Since R2 is upper bounded by zero in the very
high interference regime, it is not possible for transmitter 2
to achieve any nonzero secrecy rate, irrespective of C.
IV. OUTER BOUNDS FOR THE GAUSSIAN Z-IC MODEL
In this section, the outer bounds on the secrecy capacity
region for the Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation
are stated as Theorems 4-6. Although these outer bounds
are related to the corresponding outer bounds derived in the
deterministic case, the extension of the outer bounds to the
Gaussian case is non-trivial due to the following differences
between the two models. First, in the Gaussian case, noise
cannot be modeled by truncation as in the deterministic case.
Second, in the Gaussian case, the superposition of signals or
interference is modeled by real addition in contrast to the
modulo-2 addition used in the deterministic case. Hence, the
carry over involved in the real addition is not captured in the
deterministic case. Third, the derivation of the outer bound
in the Gaussian case involves bounding of differential en-
tropy terms containing continuous as well as discrete random
variables, due to the unidirectional cooperation between the
transmitters. This makes the derivation of the outer bounds
even more difficult.
Hence, the partitioning of the encoded messages or outputs
used in the derivation of the outer bounds for the deterministic
case cannot be directly applicable to the Gaussian case. To
overcome this problem, either analogous quantities that serve
as side-information at receiver need to be found to mimic the
partitioning of the encoded messages/outputs, or the bounding
steps need to be modified taking cue from the deterministic
model. This helps to obtain tractable outer bounds on the
secrecy capacity region, which are presented in the following
subsections.
A. Weak/moderate interference regime (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
The outer bound derived in Theorem 1 involved providing
the side information (x2a,v21) to receiver 2 by a genie. The
quantity x2a corresponds to the part of the encoded message
x2 of transmitter 2 which causes interference at receiver 1 (See
Fig. 2(a)). In the Gaussian case, to mimic the approach used
for the deterministic case, receiver 2 is provided with side
information (s2 , hcx2 + z1,v21). Note that outer bound
based on this idea was presented in [21], which considered
Gaussian Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation, but
without secrecy constraints at the receivers. For the sake
of completeness, the result is stated as Theorem 4. The
outer bound in Theorem 1 for the weak/moderate interference
regime can be considered as deterministic equivalent of the
outer bound presented below.
Theorem 4 ( [21]): The capacity region of the 2-user Gaus-
sian Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation is upper
bounded as
R1 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + SNR), R2 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + SNR),
R1 +R2 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + SNR + INR + 2
√
SNR · INR)
+ 0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR
1 + INR
)
+ CG, (6)
where SNR , h2dP and INR , h2cP .
Note that the outer bound stated in Theorem 4 does not
use the secrecy constraint at receiver. In the weak/moderate
interference regime, the data bits transmitted on the lower
levels [1 : m − n] of transmitter 2 are inherently secure in
the deterministic case as shown in Fig. 3. However, in the
Gaussian case, there is no one-to-one analogue of this as noise
cannot be modeled by truncation. The secrecy constraint at the
receiver may lead to a nonzero penalty in rate for the Gaussian
case. Hence, outer bounds are derived on the rate of user 2
and sum rate using the secrecy constraint at receiver 1, which
is stated as a theorem below.
Theorem 5: The secrecy capacity region of the 2-user Gaus-
sian Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation is upper
bounded as
R1 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + SNR),
R2 ≤ max
−1≤ρ≤1
0.5 log
(
1 + SNR
− (ρSNR +
√
SNR · INR)2
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR · INR
)
,
R1 +R2 ≤ log(1 + SNR)− 0.5 log(1 + INR) + CG. (7)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Remarks:
• It is easy to show that the outer bounds on the sum rate in
Theorem 5 is tighter than the outer bound in Theorem 4
for all values of SNR, INR and CG. Thus, the outer bound
6in Theorem 5 improves over Theorem 4. From the outer
bound on the rate of user 2 in Theorems 4 and 5, it
can be observed that outer bound obtained with secrecy
constraint is tighter compared to the outer bound obtained
without using the secrecy constraint.
• When CG = 0, the outer bound on the rate of user 2
reduces to 0.5 log
(
1 + SNR− SNR·INR1+SNR+INR
)
, as the only
possible value ρ can take is 0. Hence, this outer bound
indicates that user 2 cannot achieve the maximum pos-
sible rate of 0.5 log (1 + SNR). This is in contrast to
the deterministic case, where user 2 can achieve the
maximum rate of m, as observed from Theorem 1 and
Fig. 3.
• The outer bound on the sum rate in Theorem 4 is
applicable for all the interference regimes whereas the
outer bound in Theorem 5 is applicable only in the
weak/moderate interference regime.
B. High interference regime (1 < α < 2)
The derivation of the outer bound in this regime is based on
the outer bound in Theorem 2 obtained for the deterministic
model. In the proof of Theorem 2, to upper bound the rate
of user 2, a part of the output at receiver 1 which does
not contain signal sent by transmitter 1 is provided as side-
information to receiver 2, i.e., yN1a. In the Gaussian case, it is
not possible to partition the encoded message as it was done
for the deterministic model (See Fig. 2(b)). To overcome this
problem, output at receiver 1, i.e., yN1 , is provided as side
information to receiver 2. Providing side information in this
way creates a degraded channel from transmitter 2 to receiver 1
with respect to the channel from transmitter 2 to receiver 2. In
the deterministic case, to upper bound the sum rate, the output
at receiver 1 (yN1 ) is partitioned into two parts: yN1a and yN1b)),
and receiver 2 is provided with side information of the form
yN1a. To mimic this in the Gaussian case, output of receiver 2,
i.e., yN2 , is provided as side information to receiver 1 and
(W1,y
N
1 ) is provided as side information to receiver 2. The
outer bound on the secrecy capacity region is stated in the
following theorem.
Theorem 6: The secrecy capacity region of the 2-user Gaus-
sian Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation is upper
bounded as
R1 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + SNR),
R2 ≤ max
−1≤ρ≤1
0.5 log
(
1 + SNR
− (ρSNR +
√
SNR · INR)2
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR · INR
)
,
R1 +R2 ≤ max
−1≤ρ≤1
0.5 log
(
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR · INR
− (ρSNR +
√
SNR · INR)2
1 + SNR
)
+ 0.5 logΣy2|s + CG,
(8)
where Σy2|s , 1 + SNR − Σy2,sΣ−1s,sΣTy2,s,
Σy2,s ,
[
ρSNR ρSNR +
√
SNR · INR
]
and Σs,s ,[
1 + SNR SNR + ρ
√
SNR · INR
SNR + ρ
√
SNR · INR 1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ√SNR · INR
]
.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Remarks:
• When there is no cooperation between the transmitters,
the encoded messages at the two transmitters are indepen-
dent of each other. Hence, for the non-cooperating case,
the outer bound on the rate is obtained by setting ρ = 0
in Theorem 6.
• The outer bound in Theorem 6 is applicable over all
the interference regimes. Note that the outer bound in
Theorem 4 is also applicable to the high interference
regime. In the later part of the paper, it is demonstrated
that the outer bound in Theorem 6 is tighter than the outer
bound in Theorem 4 in this interference regime.
C. Relation between the outer bounds for the deterministic
and Gaussian models
In the following, it is shown that, for high SNR and
INR, the outer bounds for the Gaussian case in Theorems 5
and 6 are approximately equal to the outer bounds for the
deterministic model. For ease of presentation, it is assumed
that 0.5 logSNR, 0.5 log INR, and CG are integers. Recall
that, the parameters m, n and C of the deterministic model
are related to the Gaussian model as m = (⌊0.5 logSNR⌋)+,
n = (⌊0.5 log INR⌋)+ and C = ⌊CG⌋, respectively.
1) Weak/moderate interference regime (0 ≤ α ≤ 1): It is
easy to see that for high SNR and INR (i.e., SNR, INR ≫ 1),
the outer bounds on the individual rates in Theorem 4 can be
approximated as
R1 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + SNR) ≈ m,
and R2 ≤ 0.5 log(1 + SNR) ≈ m. (9)
When SNR > INR (i.e., 0 ≤ α ≤ 1), the outer bound on the
sum rate in Theorem 4 is approximated as
R1 +R2 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 + SNR + INR + 2
√
SNR · INR
)
+ 0.5 log
(
1 +
SNR
1 + INR
)
+ CG,
≈ 2m− n+ C. (10)
From (9) and (10), the outer bound derived for the Gaussian
case matches with the corresponding outer bound for the
deterministic model stated in Theorem 1.
In Theorem 5, due to the maximization involved in the outer
bound on R2 over ρ, CG = 0 is considered to simplify the
exposition. For the non-cooperating case, the outer bound is
optimized by setting ρ = 0. The outer bound on the rate of
user 2 is approximated as
R2 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 + SNR− SNR · INR
1 + SNR + INR
)
,
≈ m. (11)
7Hence, the outer bound on the rate of user 2 is approximately
equal to m for high SNR and INR.
It is also easy to see that, for high SNR and INR, the outer
bound on the sum rate in Theorem 5 can be approximated as
R1 +R2 ≈ 2m− n+ C. (12)
It can be noticed that the outer bound derived for the Gaussian
case corresponds to the outer bound for the deterministic
model stated in Theorem 1. It is interesting to note that
both the outer bounds on the sum rate in Theorems 4 and
5 correspond to the outer bound for the deterministic model
stated in Theorem 1 for high SNR and INR. However, as
mentioned earlier in the remark to Theorem 5, the outer
bound in Theorem 5 is tighter than Theorems 4. However,
for high values of SNR and INR, the gap between these
two outer bounds decreases and these two outer bounds are
approximately equal to each other.
2) High interference regime (1 < α < 2): In Theorem 6,
due to the maximization involved in the outer bounds on R2
and R1 + R2 over ρ, CG = 0 is considered to simplify the
exposition. For the non-cooperating case, the outer bound is
optimized by setting ρ = 0. First, the outer bound on the rate
of user 1 is approximated as
R1 ≤0.5 log(1 + SNR) ≈ m. (13)
The outer bound on the rate of user 2 is also approximated as
R2 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 + SNR− SNR · INR
1 + SNR + INR
)
,
≈ 2m− n. (14)
The outer bound on the sum rate becomes
R1 + R2 ≤ 0.5 log
(
1 + SNR + INR− SNR · INR
1 + SNR
)
+ 0.5 logΣy2|s, (15)
where with some algebraic manipulation it can be shown that
Σy2|s = 1+ SNR−Σy2,sΣ−1s,sΣTy2,s ≈ 1. Hence, the sum rate
outer bound in (15) reduces to
R1 +R2 ≤ m. (16)
From (13), (14), and (16), it can be observed that the approx-
imated outer bound of Gaussian case in Theorem 6 matches
with the outer bound of deterministic case in Theorem 2 for
the high interference regime.
This validates that the approaches used in obtaining outer
bounds in the two models are consistent with each other.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In the following sections, some numerical examples are
presented for the deterministic and Gaussian cases, to get
insights into the system performance in different interference
regimes.
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
R1 (bits/channel use)
R
2 
(b
its
/c
ha
nn
el
 u
se
)
 
 
C=3
C=1
C=0
Fig. 5. Secrecy capacity region of the deterministic Z-IC with (m,n) =
(5, 3). This corresponds to the moderate interference regime.
A. Deterministic Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooper-
ation
In Fig. 5, the outer bound on the secrecy capacity region
given in Theorem 1 is plotted for m = 5, n = 3 and various
values of C. The outer bound exactly matches with the lower
bound on the secrecy capacity region for the corresponding
values of C in [25]. It is interesting to note that, without
cooperation, and under the secrecy constraint at receiver 1,
when the rate of user 2 is upper bounded by 5 bits per channel
use (bpcu), the rate of user 1 is upper bounded by 2 bpcu, and
vice-versa. With further increase in the value of C, the outer
bound on the sum rate in Theorem 1 indicates that the sum
rate performance may increase. For C ≥ 3, the outer bound
suggests that both the users may be able to achieve 5 bpcu, and
the achievable result in [25] establishes this is indeed the case.
In Fig. 6, the outer bound on the secrecy capacity region given
in Theorem 2 is plotted for m = 4, n = 5 and various values of
C. When C = 0 and the rate of user 1 is upper bounded by its
maximum rate of m, i.e., 4 bpcu, the outer bound establishes
that user 2 cannot achieve any nonzero secrecy rate. When the
rate of user 2 is upper bounded by 2m− n, i.e., 3 bpcu, the
rate of user 1 is upper bounded by 1 bpcu. When C = 1, the
outer bound on the sum rate in Theorem 2 suggests that both
the users can achieve a nonzero secrecy rate with cooperation,
in contrast to the non-cooperating case. The achievable result
in [25] also confirms these observations and establishes the
capacity region of the deterministic Z-IC with unidirectional
transmitter cooperation and secrecy constraints at the receivers
in the high interference regime.
B. Gaussian Z-IC with unidirectional transmitter cooperation
In Fig. 7, the outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region
of the Z-IC in Theorems 4, 5 and 6 are compared for the
weak/moderate interference regime. The outer bound in Theo-
rem 5 is tight as compared to the outer bounds in Theorems 4
80 1 2 3 4
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
R1 (bits/channel use)
R
2 
(b
its
/c
ha
nn
el
 u
se
)
 
 
C=3
C=1
C=0
Fig. 6. Secrecy capacity region of the deterministic Z-IC with (m, n) =
(4, 5). This corresponds to the high interference regime.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region for
the Gaussian Z-IC: P = 100, hd = 1, hc = 0.5 and CG = 0.
and 6 except for the corner points for transmitter 2. Recall
that, the outer bound in Theorem 4 does not use the secrecy
constraint at the receiver in its derivation. The outer bound in
Theorem 6 is derived using the intuitions obtained from the
high interference regime case considered in the deterministic
model for Theorem 2. This is reflected in the plot as explained
above. In Fig. 8, the outer bound on the secrecy capacity
region of the Z-IC in Theorems 4 and 6 are compared for
the high interference regime. From the plot, it can be seen
that the proposed outer bound is tight as compared to the
outer bound in Theorem 4. In Figs. 9 and 10, the outer
bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian Z-IC
are plotted for different values of CG for the weak/moderate
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Fig. 8. Comparison of the outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region for
the Gaussian Z-IC: P = 100, hd = 1, hc = 1.5 and CG = 1.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the outer bounds with the achievable rate region for
the Gaussian Z-IC: P = 100, hd = 1 and hc = 0.5.
and high interference regimes, respectively. As the capacity of
the cooperative link increases, the outer bounds indicate that
the secrecy capacity region can enlarge in both the cases. This
can also be observed from the lower bounds on the secrecy
capacity region (curves labeled Ach. region) plotted in
these figures using the result in [28], [29].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This work derived outer bounds on the secrecy capacity
region of the 2-user Z-IC with limited-rate unidirectional
transmitter cooperation. The outer bounds derived for the
deterministic Z-IC model were shown to be tight for all the
interference regimes and all possible values of C. One of
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the outer bounds with the achievable rate region for
the Gaussian Z-IC: P = 100, hd = 1 and hc = 1.5.
the key techniques used in these derivations was to partition
the encoded messages and outputs depending on the value of
α. The outer bounds on the secrecy capacity region of the
Gaussian Z-IC were derived using the insights obtained from
the deterministic model. The outer bounds developed for the
deterministic model helped to establish that secrecy can be
obtained for free in the weak/moderate interference regime.
However, the developed outer bounds suggest that there can
be nonzero penalty on the rate of user 2 in all the interference
regimes for the Gaussian case. The outer bounds also indicate
that transmitter cooperation can help improve the performance
of the system in the weak, moderate and high interference
regimes, for both the models.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
In the Z-IC model considered in this paper, there is unidirec-
tional cooperation from transmitter 2 to transmitter 1. Due to
this, neither transmitter can aid in relaying other transmitter’s
message. Thus, a trivial outer bound on the individual rate of
each user is m. Hence, it is only required to establish the bound
on the sum rate. Starting from Fano’s inequality, the proof
goes as follows. Receiver 2 is provided with side information
(xN2a,v
N
21) by a genie, which leads to further upper bounding
the sum rate. Providing this side information helps to cancel
the negative entropy term in the outer bound for the sum rate,
leading to a tractable outer bound.
N [R1 +R2]
≤ I(W1;yN1 ) + I(W2;yN2 ) +NǫN ,
where ǫN → 0 as N →∞,
≤ I(W1;yN1 ) + I(W2;yN2 ,xN2a,vN21) +NǫN ,
= H(yN1 )−H(yN1 |W1) +H(vN21)−H(vN21|W2)
+H(xN2a|vN21)−H(xN2a|vN21,W2) +H(yN2 |xN2a,vN21)
−H(yN2 |xN2a,vN21,W2) +NǫN ,
≤ H(yN1 )−H(yN1 |W1,xN1 ,vN21) +H(vN21)−H(vN21|W2)
+H(xN2a|vN21)−H(xN2a|vN21,W2) +H(xN2b|xN2a,vt21)
−H(xN2b|xN2a,vN21,W2) +NǫN , (17)
where the last step is obtained using the fact that conditioning
cannot increase the entropy.
Note that due to cooperation between the transmitters, the
encoded messages are dependent, and hence, it is difficult to
bound or simplify the entropy terms. Here, partitioning of the
output y1 = (x1a,x1b ⊕ x2a) as shown in Fig. 2(a) helps
to simplify the bound further. In the following, the fact that
removing conditioning cannot decrease the entropy has also
been used.
N [R1 +R2]
(a)
≤ H(yN1 )−H(xN2a|vN21) +H(vN21)−H(vN21|W2)
+H(xN2a|vN21)−H(xN2a|vN21,W2) +H(xN2b)
−H(xN2b|xN2a,vN21,W2) +NǫN ,
≤ H(yN1 ) +H(vN21) +H(xN2b) +NǫN ,
or R1 +R2
(b)
≤ 2m− n+ C, (18)
where (a) is obtained using the relation in (3) and (b) is
obtained by bounding the entropy terms H(y1), H(v21) and
H(x2b) by m, C and m−n, respectively. This completes the
proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
As mentioned earlier in the proof of Theorem 1, the rate
of user 1 is upper bounded by m. The output at receiver 1
is partitioned into two parts yN1 = (yN1a,yN1b) as shown in
Fig. 2(b). A genie provides part of the output of receiver 1,
namely, yN1a, as side-information to receiver 2. Note that, yN1a
does not contain any signal sent from transmitter 1. Using
Fano’s inequality the following is obtained
NR2 ≤ I(W2;yN1a) + I(W2;yN2 |yN1a) +NǫN , (19)
Using the secrecy constraint at receiver 1, I(W2;yN1 ) =
I(W2;y
N
1a,y
N
1b) ≤ NǫN , the first term above is upper bounded
as I(W2;y
N
1a) ≤ NǫN as mutual information cannot be
negative. Hence, NR2 ≤ H(yN2 |yN1a) + NǫN , which can
be further upper bounded as NR2 ≤ H(xN2b|xN2a) + NǫN .
Since, H(x2b) is upper bounded by 2m − n, one obtains
R2 ≤ 2m− n.
Next, using Fano’s inequality and providing yN1a as side
information to receiver 2, the sum rate is upper bounded as
N [R1 +R2] ≤ I(W1;yN1 ) + I(W2;yN2 ,yN1a) +NǫN . (20)
Using the fact that the encoding at transmitter 2 does not
depend on W1, it can be seen that I(W1;yN1a,yN1b) =
I(W1;y
N
1b|xN2a). The second mutual information term in (20) is
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upper bounded using the relation I(W2;yN1a) ≤ NǫN . Hence,
the outer bound on the sum rate becomes
N [R1 +R2]
≤ I(W1;yN1b|xN2a) + I(W2;yN2 |yN1a) +NǫN ,
≤ H(yN1b|xN2a)−H(yN1b|xN2a,W1) +H(yN2 |yN1a)
−H(yN2 |yN1a,W2) +NǫN ,
(a)
≤ H(yN1b|xN2a)−H(yN1b|xN2a,W1,xN1 ) +H(yN2 |yN1a)
−H(yN2 |yN1a,W2) +NǫN ,
≤ H(yN1b|xN2a)−H(xN2b,xN2c|xN2a,W1,xN1 ,vN21) +H(xN2b|xN2a)
−H(xN2b|xN2a,W2) +NǫN ,
(b)
= H(yN1b|xN2a)−H(xN2b,xN2c|xN2a,vN21) +H(xN2b|xN2a)
−H(xN2b|xN2a,W2) +NǫN ,
≤ H(yN1b)−H(xN2b|xN2a,vN21)−H(xN2c|xN2b,xN2a,vN21)
+H(xN2b,v
N
21|xN2a)−H(xN2b|xN2a,W2) +NǫN ,
(c)
≤ H(yN1b)−H(xN2b|xN2a,vN21)−H(xN2c|xN2b,xN2a,vN21)
+H(vN21) +H(x
N
2b|xN2a,vN21)−H(xN2b|xN2a,W2) +NǫN ,
≤ H(yN1b) +H(vN21) +NǫN ,
or R1 +R2 ≤ m+ C, (21)
where (a) is because conditioning cannot increase the entropy;
(b) is obtained using the relation in (3); (c) follows because
removing conditioning cannot decrease the entropy, and using
the chain rule for joint entropy. This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 3
As mentioned in the proof of Theorem 1, the rate of user 1
is upper bounded by m. To bound the rate of user 2, yN1a is
provided as side-information to receiver 2 as follows and the
outer bound is simplified as follows
NR2 ≤ I(W2;yN2 ,yN1a) +NǫN ,
= I(W2;y
N
1a) + I(W2;y
N
2 |yN1a) +NǫN ,
or R2 ≤ 0, (22)
where the above equation is obtained using the secrecy
constraint at receiver 1, i.e., I(W2;yN1a) ≤ Nǫ and
I(W2;y
N
2 |yN1a) = 0 as observed from Fig. 4. This completes
the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 5
It is easy to see that the rate of transmitter 1 is upper
bounded by 0.5 log(1 + SNR). Hence, it is required to proof
the outer bounds on the rate of transmitter 2 and the sum rate.
Using Fano’s inequality, rate of transmitter 2 is upper bounded
as follows
NR2 ≤ I(W2;yN2 ) +NǫN ,
≤ I(W2;yN2 ,yN1 ) +NǫN ,
= I(W2;y
N
1 ) + I(W2;y
N
2 |yN1 ) +NǫN ,
(a)
≤ h(yN2 |yN1 )− h(yN2 |yN1 ,W2) +NǫN ,
or R2
(b)
≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
0.5 log
(
1 + SNR−
(ρSNR +
√
SNR · INR)2
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR · INR
)
, (23)
where (a) is obtained using the secrecy constraint at the
receiver 1; (b) is obtained using the fact that for a given
power constraint, the differential entropy is maximized by the
Gaussian distribution.
In the following, sum rate is upper bounded using Fano’s
inequality, secrecy constraint at receiver 1 and chain rule of
mutual information.
N [R1 +R2]
≤ I(W1;yN1 ) + I(W2;yN2 )− I(W2;yN1 ) +NǫN ,
= I(W1;y
N
1 ) + I(W2;y
N
2 )− I(W2;yN1 , sN2 )
+ I(W2; s
N
2 |yN1 ) +NǫN , where sN2 , hcxN2 + zN1 .
(24)
The main novelty in the proof lies in bounding these mutual
information terms. To upper bound the sum rate further, con-
sider the first two terms of (24), where the cooperative signal
vN21 is provided as side-information to both the receivers.
I(W1;y
N
1 ) + I(W2; s
N
2 |yN1 )
(a)
≤ I(W1;yN1 |vN21) + I(W2;vN21|yN1 ) + I(W2; sN2 |yN1 ,vN21),
≤ I(W1,xN1 ;yN1 |vN21) + I(W2;vN21|yN1 ) + I(W2; sN2 |yN1 ,vN21),
(b)
= I(xN1 ;y
N
1 |vN21) + I(W2;vN21|yN1 ) + I(W2; sN2 |yN1 ,vN21),
= I(xN1 ;y
N
1 |vN21) +H(vN21|yN1 )−H(vN21|yN1 ,W2)
+ h(sN2 |yN1 ,vN21)− h(sN2 |yN1 ,vN21,W2),
(c)
≤ I(xN1 ;yN1 |vN21) +H(vN21) + h(sN2 ,yN1 |vN21)− h(yN1 |vN21)
− h(sN2 |yN1 ,vN21,W2),
= I(xN1 ;y
N
1 |vN21) +H(vN21) + h(sN2 |vN21) + h(yN1 |sN2 ,vN21)
− h(yN1 |vN21)− h(sN2 |yN1 ,vN21,W2),
(25)
where (a) is obtained using the chain rule for mutual in-
formation and the fact that v21 is not a function of W1;
(b) is obtained using the Markov chain relation: W1 →
(v21,x1) → y1, which can shown using the signal flow
graph (SFG) approach in [30]; (c) follows because removing
conditioning cannot decrease entropy and h(sN2 ,yN1 |vN21) =
h(yN1 |vN21) + h(sN2 |yN1 ,vN21).
Note that the bounding these differential entropy terms in
above is difficult as it involves continuous and discrete random
variables. To overcome this problem, using relation in (3), it
can be shown that h(sN2 |vN21) = h(sN2 |vN21,xN1 ). This also
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implies that h(sN2 |vN21,xN1 ) = h(yN1 |vN21,xN1 ). This is one of
the key steps in the derivation as it leads to cancelation of
I(xN1 ;y
N
1 |vN21) as shown below.
I(W1;y
N
1 ) + I(W2; s
N
2 |yN1 )
≤ I(xN1 ;yN1 |vN21) +H(vN21) + h(sN2 |vN21,xN1 )
+ h(yN1 |sN2 ,vN21)− h(yN1 |vN21)− h(sN2 |yN1 ,vN21,W2),
= I(xN1 ;y
N
1 |vN21) +H(vN21) + h(yN1 |vN21,xN1 )
+ h(yN1 |sN2 ,vN21)− h(yN1 |vN21)− h(sN2 |yN1 ,vN21,W2),
(a)
≤ I(xN1 ;yN1 |vN21) +NCG − I(xN1 ;yN1 |vN21) + h(yN1 |sN2 ,vN21)
− h(sN2 |yN1 ,vN21,W2,xN2 ),
(b)
= NCG + h(y
N
1 |sN2 ,vN21)− h(sN2 |yN1 ,vN21,xN2 ),
= NCG + h(y
N
1 |sN2 ,vN21)− h(sN2 ,yN1 |vN21,xN2 )
+ h(yN1 |vN21,xN2 ),
= h(yN1 |sN2 ,vN21)− h(sN2 |xN2 ,vN21)− h(yN1 |sN2 ,xN2 ,vN21)
+ h(yN1 |xN2 ,vN21) +NCG,
(c)
≤ h(sN1 )− h(zN1 ) +NCG, where sN1 , hdxN1 + zN1 ,
(26)
where (a) is obtained using the fact that conditioning cannot
increase the differential entropy and H(vN21) ≤ NCG; (b)
is obtained using the fact that I(W2; sN2 |yN1 ,vN21,xN2 ) = 0,
which can again be shown with the help of an SFG [30];
and (c) is obtained by noticing that first and third term cancel
with each other using the relation in (3) and using the fact
that conditioning cannot increase the differential entropy.
Now, consider the bounding of the remaining two terms
in (24). As it involves difference of two mutual information
terms, it is not straightforward to upper bound these terms.
In the weak/moderate interference regime, the channel from
transmitter 2 to receiver 1 is weaker as compared to the
channel from transmitter 2 to receiver 1. Hence, x2, y2 and s2
satisfy the following Markov chain: x2 → y2 → s2 and this
channel can be viewed as a degraded broadcast channel (BC).
Using the result in [20], [31], following bound is obtained.
I(W2;y
N
2 )− I(W2;yN1 , sN2 )
= I(W2;y
N
2 )− I(W2; sN2 )− I(W2,yN1 |sN2 ),
≤ I(W2;yN2 )− I(W2; sN2 ),
≤ N [I(x2;y2)− I(x2; s2)], (27)
Finally, using (26) and (27), (24) becomes
R1 +R2 ≤ log(1 + SNR)− 0.5 log(1 + INR) + CG, (28)
where the above equation is obtained using the fact that for a
given power constraint, Gaussian distribution maximizes the
differential entropy. This completes the proof.
E. Proof of Theorem 6
As mentioned earlier, rate of transmitter 1 is upper bounded
by 0.5 log(1 + SNR). Hence, it is required to proof the outer
bounds on the rate of transmitter 2 and the sum rate. Using
the steps used to obtain outer bound on the rate of user 2 in
the proof of Theorem 5, following bound is obtained
NR2 ≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
0.5 log
(
1 + SNR
− (ρSNR +
√
SNR · INR)2
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR · INR
)
, (29)
The derivation of the outer bound on the sum rate goes
as follows. First, an outer bound on the rate of user 1 is
obtained. Then, an outer bound on the rate of user 2 is derived.
Adding these two outer bounds leads to cancelation of negative
differential entropy terms, which in turn allows to obtain single
letter characterization of the sum rate outer bound.
In the following, an outer bound on the rate of user 1 is
obtained providing yN2 as side-information to receiver 1.
NR1 ≤ I(W1;yN1 ,yN2 ) +NǫN ,
(a)
= I(W1;y
N
1 |yN2 ) +NǫN ,
(b)
≤ h(yN1 |yN2 )− h(sN1 |yN2 ,W1,xN2 ,vN21) +NǫN ,
where sN1 , hdxN1 + zN1
(c)
≤ h(yN1 |yN2 )− h(s˜N1 |yN2 ,W1,xN2 ,vN21) +NǫN ,
where s˜N1 , hdxN1 + z˜N1 ,
(d)
= h(yN1 |yN2 )− h(s˜N1 |W1,vN21) +NǫN , (30)
where (a) is obtained using the fact that yN2 is independent of
W1; (b) is obtained using the fact that conditioning cannot
increase the differential entropy; (c) is obtained using the
fact that the secrecy capacity region of Z-IC with confidential
messages is invariant under any joint channel noise distribu-
tion P (zN1 , zN2 ) that leads to the same marginal distributions
P (zN1 ) and P (zN2 ) [32]. Although this invariance property
is stated for the Gaussian IC in [32], it holds for the Z-IC
with limited-rate transmitter cooperation also. The need for
replacing zN1 with z˜N1 will become clear later in the proof.
Finally, (d) is obtained using the relation in (3).
Next, to bound the rate of user 2, starting from Fano’s
inequality, one proceeds as follows. The genie provides
(yN1 ,W1) as side-information to receiver 2 and the sum rate
is further upper bounded as follows
NR2 ≤ I(W2;yN1 ,W1) + I(W2;yN2 |yN1 ,W1) +NǫN .
(31)
Consider the first term in (31)
I(W2;y
N
1 ,W1)
(a)
≤ NǫN +H(W1|yN1 )−H(W1|yN1 ,W2),
(b)
≤ NǫN , (32)
where (a) is obtained using the secrecy constraint at receiver 1,
i.e., I(W2;yN1 ) ≤ NǫN and (b) is obtained from the reliability
condition for message W1, i.e., H(W1|yN1 ) ≤ NδN and
dropping the negative entropy term. In above, for notational
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simplicity, δN is absorbed to ǫN . Using (32), (31) reduces to
NR2 ≤ I(W2;yN2 ,vN21|yN1 ,W1) +NǫN ,
= I(W2;v
N
21|yN1 ,W1) + I(W2;yN2 |vN21,yN1 ,W1) +NǫN .
(33)
To bound the rate of user 2 further, s˜N1 is included in the
second mutual information term. In the following, it can
be noticed that working with s˜N1 instead of sN1 leads to
−h(z˜N1 ) instead of 0. Thus, replacing the noise in sN1 with
an independent noise leads to a tighter outer bound. Hence,
the outer bound on R2 becomes
R2 ≤ H(vN21|yN1 ,W1)−H(vN21|yN1 ,W1,W2)
+ I(W2;y
N
2 , s˜
N
1 |vN21,yN1 ,W1) +NǫN ,
(a)
≤ H(vN21) + I(W2; s˜N1 |vN21,yN1 ,W1)
+ I(W2;y
N
2 |vN21,yN1 ,W1, s˜N1 ) +NǫN ,
(b)
≤ H(vN21) + h(s˜N1 |vN21,W1)− h(s˜N1 |vN21,yN1 ,W1,W2,xN2 )
+ h(yN2 |yN1 , s˜N1 )− h(yN2 |vN21,yN1 ,W1, s˜N1 ,W2,xN2 )
+NǫN ,
= H(vN21) + h(s˜
N
1 |vN21,W1)− h(z˜N1 ) + h(yN2 |yN1 , s˜N1 )
− h(zN2 ) +NǫN , (34)
where (a) and (b) are obtained using the fact that removing
(or adding) conditioning cannot decrease (or cannot increase)
the differential entropy.
Adding (30) and (34), the following is obtained
R1 +R2
≤ H(v21) + h(y1|y2) + h(y2|y1, s˜1)− h(z˜1)− h(z2),
≤ max
0≤|ρ|≤1
CG + 0.5 log
[
1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR · INR
− (ρSNR +
√
SNR · INR)2
1 + SNR
]
+ 0.5 logΣy2|s, (35)
where Σy2|s is as defined in the statement of the theorem.
The above equation is obtained using the fact that for a
given power constraint, the Gaussian distribution maximizes
the conditional differential entropy. The individual terms in
the above equations are simplified as follows
h(y1|y2) = 0.5 log 2πeΣy1|y2 , (36)
where
Σy1|y2 = E[y
2
1]−
E[y1y2]
2
E[y22]
,
= 1 + SNR + INR + 2ρ
√
SNR · INR
− (ρSNR +
√
SNR · INR)2
1 + SNR . (37)
The term Σy2|s is obtained as follows
Σy2|s = E[y
2
2]− E[y2sT ]E[ssT ]−1E[sy2],
where s , [s˜1 y1]T ,
= 1 + SNR− Σy2,sΣ−1s,sΣTy2,s. (38)
In the above equation, the terms Σy2,s and Σs,s are as defined
in the statement of the theorem. This completes the proof.
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